From Procurement to Alliance: Mapping GCC- Türkiye Defense Industry and Armament Cooperation
The burgeoning partnership between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Türkiye in the defense industry represents a significant geopolitical, defense, and economic development in the Middle East. The importance of this domain has only increased following the 2026 Israel-US-Iran war, the formation of the “Mecca Defense Alliance” between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, and the Badr MoU between Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Indone ...
Abstract
The burgeoning partnership between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Türkiye in the defense industry represents a significant geopolitical, defense, and economic development in the Middle East. The importance of this domain has only increased following the 2026 Israel-US-Iran war, the formation of the “Mecca Defense Alliance” between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, and the Badr MoU between Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Taking these developments into consideration and their impact on Gulf security, this workshop will explore the multifaceted dimensions of this security and defense cooperation between the GCC states and Türkiye, focusing on arms transfers, defense-industry, and military cooperation between them. As GCC nations accelerate their efforts to localize defense production and diversify their military suppliers, Türkiye has emerged as a key partner, offering advanced and battle-proven technologies, forging partnerships, and transferring technology. This workshop will analyze the nature, drivers, opportunities, challenges, and future trajectories of this evolving relationship, examining its impact on the regional balance of power, the role of traditional arm suppliers, and the development of indigenous defense capabilities in the Gulf.
Description and Rationale
The defense and security relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Türkiye has undergone a significant transformation since 2002, entering a new era of strategic cooperation, particularly after the Al-Ula agreement in 2021, the Mecca Defense Alliance, and the Badr MoU in 2026. This partnership has evolved beyond traditional arms sales to include joint development, technology transfer, co-production, and alliance, reflecting a mutual commitment to enhancing strategic autonomy and regional security. Historically, GCC states relied heavily on Western arms and security guarantees, primarily from the United States. Concerns regarding the reliability of these partnerships have been underscored by several significant events: the 2017 GCC crisis, the attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, assaults on Emirati infrastructure in 2020, Iranian and Israeli attacks on Doha in 2025, and, most notably, Iranian aggression against the GCC states during the Israel-US-Iran war of 2026. These incidents have prompted the Arab Gulf nations to diversify their defense alliances and arms imports and increase defense localization efforts.
Turkiye, with its rapidly advancing defense sector, emerged as a capable and reliable partner. The international recognition of Turkish combat-proven platforms, particularly its unmanned systems, combined with Ankara's willingness to transfer technology and its openness to foster strategic partnerships with Islamic countries—especially concerning strategic projects such as the fifth-generation fighter jet, KAAN— has made Türkiye an attractive alternative for GCC states. This gains more importance as these nations seek to diversify their defense ties and arms imports, enhance their military capabilities, and reduce their dependency on traditional suppliers. Accordingly, a surge in arms agreements occurred between 2021 and 2026. This cooperation has broadened from simple procurement to establishing a robust defense-industry partnership. Leading Turkish defense companies like ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, HAVELSAN, BAYKAR, TAI, ARCA, FNSS, ASFALT, MKE, STM, BMC, and others have opened offices or formed partnerships in the GCC. High-level defense agreements and joint ventures have become more common, exemplified by the landmark agreement between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia for the co-production of Turkish drones. The UAE and Qatar have also become key partners, making significant investments in Turkish defense firms and engaging in joint development projects. These "mega agreements" signify a long-term commitment to strategic collaboration, focusing on joint production and technology transfer to develop indigenous defense capabilities in the Gulf.
The strategic rationale for this partnership is multifaceted. For GCC states, it provides access to advanced military technology, opportunities for technology transfer to support their own defense industries, and a more diversified supply chain. For Türkiye, the GCC is a lucrative market and a strategic partner with shared goals of regional stability. The economic, military, and security benefits foster a symbiotic relationship that serves both sides. However, challenges remain. While GCC states accounted for a significant portion of Türkiye’s defense exports, the total value is still small compared to the Gulf's overall arms imports from Western allies and in relation to Türkiye's GDP. This indicates that substantial effort is needed to increase and institutionalize imports and investments in joint projects. Shared security concerns and mutual economic and strategic benefits have consistently driven the relationship forward. As the Middle East witnesses a period of profound change following the 2026 Israel-US-Iran war and the formation of the Mecca Defense Alliance, and the Badr agreement, the GCC-Türkiye defense partnership is poised to play an increasingly crucial role in shaping the regional security architecture.
